病急乱投医！

丁丁

“库存未降房市崩，专家原来不读书。” 房地产低迷，居民消费低迷，经济陷入困境，引来各路专家献计献策，各种奇葩的建议乱飞。有的专家建议对50万以上存款收税，促进居民把钱取出来消费，从而促进消费，促进经济恢复。有的国师专家大声疾呼，债务是经济重启的关键，号召拯救房地产市场，恢复房地产作为抵押物的上涨预期。他们建议发行天量国债，置换地方债，让地方政府有能力严格控制土地供应，不卖地，推高价，从而推高房价，扭转预期。当然，真正的国师早就反复声明了房地产在中国经济的支柱地位。从野生专家到庙堂国师，专家们一个比一个急，争当御医，献计献策。

但是，所有的建议，都反映出一众专家对信用，房地产，以及经济底层运行机制的无知。其实，索罗斯早在40年前写的《金融炼金术》里就描述了目前中国问题的核心，信用周期走到末端，由于内在的反身性机制，必然调整。成也萧何，败也萧何。信用扩张带来繁荣，信用崩溃带来萧条。坐上了房地产为核心抵押物的过山车，却只愿意上山，却不愿意下山。这山可怎么过？

There seems to be a special affinity between reflexivity and credit. That is hardly surprising: credit depends on expectations; expectations involve bias; hence credit is one of the main avenues that permit bias to play a causal role in the course of events. But there is more to it. Credit seems to be associated with a particular kind of reflexive pattern that is known as boom and bust. The pattern is asymmetrical: the boom is drawn out and accelerates gradually; the bust is sudden and often catastrophic. By contrast, when credit is not an essential ingredient in a reflexive process, the pattern tends to be more symmetrical. For instance, in the currency market it does not seem to make much difference whether the dollar is rising or falling: the exchange rate seems to follow a wavelike pattern.

在反身性与信用之间似乎有一种特殊的紧密联系。这并不奇怪：信用依赖预期，预期涉及偏见，因此信用是让偏见在事件发展中起到作用的一个主要途径。但是更重要的是，信用似乎与某种特殊的反身模式，即繁荣与崩溃的模式相关联。这种模式是不对称的：繁荣慢慢发生，逐渐加速。崩溃突然发生，而且常常是灾难性的。与之相反，当信用不是一个反身过程的重要组成部分时，这种模式倾向于更对称。比如在货币市场，无论美元是涨还是跌，模式并没有太多不同：汇率似乎遵循波浪形的模式。

I believe the asymmetry arises out of a reflexive connection between loan and collateral. In this context I give collateral a very broad definition: it will denote whatever determines the creditworthiness of a debtor, whether it is actually pledged or not. It may mean a piece of property or an expected future stream of income; in either case, it is something on which the lender is willing to place a value. Valuation is supposed to be a passive relationship in which the value reflects the underlying asset; but in this case it involves a positive act: a loan is made. The act of lending may affect the collateral value: that is the connection that gives rise to a reflexive process.

我认为这种不对称源自贷款与抵押品之间的反身性联系。在此我给抵押品一个非常广泛的定义：抵押品是指任何决定一个债务人信用度的东西，无论该物是否实际进行了抵押。抵押品可以是一块地产，或者预期的未来收入现金流。在这两个例子里，抵押品都是放贷人愿意给出一个价值的东西。估值本应是一种被动的关系，即价值反映资产的情况。但在这个例子里，估值涉及到了一个主动的行为：一笔贷款被贷出了。放贷的行为本身会影响抵押品的价值：这种联系产生了一种反身过程。

It will be recalled that we have analyzed reflexivity as two connections working in opposite directions: the “normal” connection where a value is placed on future events, as in the stock market or banking – we have called it the cognitive function; and a “perverse” connection in which expectations affect that which is expected – we have called it the participating function. The participating function is perverse because its effect is not always felt, and when it does operate its influence is so difficult to disentangle that it tends to go unrecognized. The prevailing view of how financial markets operate tends to leave the participating function out of account. For instance, in the international lending boom, bankers did not recognize that the debt ratios of borrowing countries were favorably influence by their own lending activity. In the conglomerate boom, investors did not realize that per-share earnings growth can be affected by the valuation they place on it. At present, most people do not realize that the erosion of collateral values can depress the economy.

记得我们分析的反身性有两个相反方向运作的节点：“正常”的节点，在此处给未来事件评估价值，比如在股票市场或银行业，我们称之为认知功能。还有一个“反常”的节点，在此处预期影响所预期的东西，我们称之为参与功能。参与功能是反常的因为其效果并不总是被感受到，而当其确实施加影响时，却如此难以整理识别出来，趋于无法被认知。关于金融市场如何运作的盛行偏见倾向于把参与功能排除在外。比如，在国际借贷繁荣中，银行家们没有意识到贷款国家的债务比率由于银行家们自己的放贷活动而受到正面影响。在企业集团繁荣中，投资者没有意识到每股盈利增长能被他们自己所做的估值所影响。目前，大多数人没有意识到抵押物价值的贬值能抑制经济。

The act of lending usually stimulates economic activity. It enables the borrower to consume more than he would otherwise, or to invest in productive assets. There are exceptions, to be sure: if the assets in question are not physical but financial ones, the effect is not necessarily stimulative. By the same token, debt service has a depressing impact. Resources that would otherwise be devoted to consumption or the creation of a future stream of income are withdrawn. As the total amount of debt outstanding accumulates, the portion that has to be utilized for debt service increases. It is only net new lending that stimulates, and total new lending has to keep rising in order to keep net new lending stable.

放贷行为通常刺激经济活动，让借贷人比不借贷时消费更多，或者投资于生产性资产。但准确讲也有例外：如果资产不是实物而是金融资产，效果就不一定是刺激性的。同样的道理，债务偿付具有抑制性的影响。本来可以用于消费或创造未来收入的资源被收走。当债务总量逐渐积累，必须被用来还本付息的部分增加。只有净新增贷款才起到刺激作用，而总的新增贷款必须不断增长来保持净新增贷款稳定。

The connection between lending and economic activity is far from straightforward (that is, in fact, the best justification for the monetarists’ preoccupation with money supply, to the neglect of credit). The major difficulty is that credit need not be involved in the physical production or consumption of goods and services; it may be used for purely financial purposes. In this case, its influence on economic activity becomes problematic. For purpose of this discussion it may be helpful to distinguish between a “real” economy and a “financial” economy. Economic activity takes place in the “real” economy, while the extension and repayment of credit occur in the “financial” economy. The reflexive interaction between the act of lending and the value of the collateral may then connect the “real” and the “financial” economy or it may be confined to the “financial” economy. Here we shall focus on the first case.

信贷与经济活动之间的联系远不是那么直接（实际上，两者的直接联系是货币主义者痴迷于货币供应而忽视信用的最好理由）。最主要的难点在于，信用无需介入实物生产或消费商品和服务。信用可以纯粹用于金融目的。当用于金融目的时，信用对经济活动的影响就产生了问题。基于这个讨论的目的，有必要区分“实体”经济和“金融”经济。经济活动发生于“实体”经济，而发放和偿还信用发生在“金融”经济。放贷行为与抵押品价值这两者之间的反身交互作用可以把“实体”经济和“金融”经济连接起来，也可以局限于“金融”经济。这里我们着重探讨前者。

A strong economy tends to enhance the asset values and income streams that serve to determine creditworthiness. In the early stages of a reflexive process of credit expansion the amount of credit involved is relatively small so that its impact on collateral values is negligible. That is why the expansionary phase is slow to start with and credit remains soundly based at first. But as the amount of debt accumulates, total lending increases in importance and begins to have an appreciable effect on collateral values. The process continues until a point is reached where total credit cannot increase fast enough to continue stimulating the economy. By that time, collateral values have become greatly dependent on the stimulative effect of new lending and, as new lending fails to accelerate, collateral values begin to decline. The erosion of collateral values has a depressing effect on economic activity, which in turn reinforces the erosion of collateral values. Since the collateral has been pretty fully utilized at that point, a decline may precipitate the liquidation of loans, which in turn may make the decline more precipitous. That is the anatomy of a typical boom and bust.

一个强健的经济趋于增强资产价值与收入，这些因素决定信用度。在信用扩张的反身过程早期，涉及的信用量相对较少，因此对抵押品价值的影响微不足道。这就是为什么扩张阶段启动很慢，信用最初保持着健全的基础。但是，当债务逐渐积累，总贷款变得越发重要，而且开始对抵押品价值产生显著的影响。这个过程持续进行，直到总信用无法足够快的增长来继续刺激经济。这时候，抵押品价值已经变得严重依赖于新增贷款的刺激作用。当新增贷款不再加速，抵押品价值开始下跌。抵押品价值的贬值对经济活动具有抑制作用，而经济活动的受抑制则反过来强化了抵押品价值的贬值。因为这时抵押品已经相当完全的被利用了，价值的下跌会加速贷款的清偿，从而让抵押品价值的下跌更加剧烈。这就是一个典型的繁荣与崩溃的剖析。

Booms and busts are not symmetrical because, at the inception of a boom, both the volume of credit and the value of the collateral are at a minimum; at the time of the bust, both are at a maximum. But there is another factor at play. The liquidation of loans takes time; the faster it has to be accomplished, the greater the effect on the value of the collateral. In a bust, the reflexive interaction between loans and collateral becomes compressed within a very short time frame and the consequences can be catastrophic. It is the sudden liquidation of accumulated positions that gives a bust such a difference shape from the preceding boom.

繁荣与崩溃并不对称，因为当繁荣开始的时候，信用量与抵押品价值都处于最低，而当崩溃来临时，这两者都处于最高。但是还有另一个因素起了作用。贷款的清偿需要时间，清偿越快完成，对抵押品价值的影响越大。在崩溃时，贷款与抵押品之间的反身交互作用被压缩到了一个很短的时间里，所以后果有可能是灾难性的。正因为积累的存量被突然清偿，这让崩溃有了与之前的繁荣截然不同的形态。

Credit Cycle Hypothesis

It will be recalled that I envision a reflexive relationship between the act of lending and the value of the collateral that serves as security for the loans. Net new lending acts as a stimulant that enhances the borrowers’ ability to service their debt. As the amount of debt outstanding grows, an increasing portion of new lending goes to service outstanding debt and credit has to grow exponentially to maintain its stimulating effect. Eventually the growth of credit has to slow down with a negative effect on collateral values. If the collateral has been fully utilized, the decline in collateral values precipitates further liquidation of credit, giving rise to a typical boom/bust sequence.

记得我预见的放贷行为与作为贷款担保的抵押品价值之间的反身关系。净新增贷款作为一种刺激，增强了借贷人偿还债务的能力。当未偿还的债务量增长，新增贷款更多被用来偿还现有的债务，而信用必须以指数增长来保持其刺激效果。最终，信用增长必须放缓，从而对抵押品价值造成负面影响。如果抵押品已经被完全利用，抵押品价值的下跌则进一步加剧信用清偿，引发了一个典型的繁荣/崩溃交替。

The trouble is that real life is not as simple as the model I have been working with. In particular, the transition from credit expansion to credit contraction does not occur at a single point of time because it would precipitate an implosion that the authorities are determined to prevent. Official intervention complicates matters. The turning point does not occur at a single moment of time, but different segments of the credit structure follow different timetables. To locate our position in the credit cycle, it is necessary to disaggregate the process and consider the main elements of credit separately.

问题在于现实生活并不像我一直在研究的模型般简单。尤其是从信用扩张到信用收缩的转换并不在一个时间点上发生，因为那样会引发内爆，而这是当局决意要避免的。官方的干预让事情更复杂了。拐点并不发生在同一个时间点，而是信用结构的不同区域遵循不同的时间表。为了确认我们在信用周期中的位置，必须把过程分解，并分别考虑信用的主要因素。

索罗斯在《金融炼金术》中对信用周期的分析与明斯基在《稳住不稳定的经济》一书中的论述有着异曲同工的效果。两者都认为经济系统存在内在的不稳定性。明斯基从对冲融资、投机融资、庞氏融资，三种不同的借贷人角度分析，而索罗斯则从信用的增长、抵押品与信用的反身关系来阐述。索罗斯认为，到了信用扩张的末期，信用必须以指数增长才能保持刺激效果。这其中的根本原因就在于投机借贷人和庞氏借贷人需要不断借新还旧，偿还复利增长的本息，从而造成了新增贷款需求的指数增长。一旦新增贷款无法指数增长，信用周期逆转，抵押品与信用的反身关系就变成了恶性循环，快速下行崩盘。

一系列现象表明，中国已经进入了信用扩张的末期。一个信用收缩的反身过程已经开始。而信用收缩的后果有多严重，就要看监管层的努力了。所有人都没意识到的是，不仅房地产是中国信用周期的核心抵押物，而且居民的未来现金流预期同样也是核心的抵押物，极端重要。这种抵押物看不见，摸不着，建立在对未来的信心之上，影响远远大于钢筋水泥的房地产。一切涸泽而渔，继续消耗居民现金流的举措，都会适得其反，让居民降杠杆，而不是加杠杆，反而让问题恶化。一切继续加码，加大土地垄断，给房地产续命的措施，最终都会失败，因为房地产作为中国信用周期的核心抵押物，已经被完全利用，过度透支，强行续命只会适得其反。

病急乱投医！慌乱之中，听从巫医，以奇葩的方法乱治病，最终很可能一命呜呼。

yaner

有句老话：你这个病啊，看看中医吧……